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I. INTRODUCTION
THE Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in National Federation of Inde-pendent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),1 which paved the way for im-plementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Affordable Care Act, or ACA),2 is best known for rejecting a constitu-
tional challenge to the Act’s mandate that all persons obtain health insur-
ance coverage.3 However, NFIB also decided a second, equally important
issue: a Spending Clause challenge to the ACA’s expansion of the Medi-
caid program.4 In an opinion that had far-reaching implications both for
the health care reform initiative and for Spending Clause jurisprudence,
the Court upheld the Medicaid Expansion itself, but struck down a key
portion of the inducement for states to participate in the expansion.5
The ACA was enacted in 2010,6 with a primary objective of assuring
“near-universal” health insurance coverage for the American public.7 The
ACA sought to accomplish this objective through a combination of mea-
sures by which most Americans would have insurance coverage for a
package of “essential health benefits.”8 Coverage for low-income individ-
uals would be  assured through an expansion of the Medicaid program to
cover all adults under the age of sixty-five with incomes below 138%9 of
the federal poverty guidelines (the Medicaid Expansion).10 Adults not
covered by Medicaid or another benefit program11 would be required to
purchase the “essential health benefits” package from a private insurer
(the Individual Mandate), with or without federal subsidies.12
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
3. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601.
4. Id. at 2608.
5. Id.
6. 124 Stat. 119.
7. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664 (joint dissent).
8. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u-7(b)(5), 18022(b) (2012).
9. Under the ACA, the eligibility threshold is 133% of the federal poverty level, but
5% of an individual’s income is disregarded, raising the effective limit to 138%. Estimates
for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act Updated for the Recent
Supreme Court Decision, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 6–7, n.13 (July 2012), www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(m)(1)(A) (2012). Children at this level of poverty had been cov-
ered since the enactment of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program in 1997. Chap-
ter I: Early Implementation of the Child Health Insurance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVICES, http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/earlychip/intro.htm (last visited Feb.
19, 2015). The use of a figure higher than the federal poverty level to define eligibility for
federal benefit programs is common, since the poverty guidelines are based on an outdated
formula and are generally regarded as under-measuring actual poverty. See, e.g., Rebecca
M. Blank, Why the United States Needs an Improved Measure of Poverty, BROOKINGS (July
17, 2008), www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2008/07/17-poverty-blank.
11. Other benefit programs that satisfy the “minimum essential coverage” require-
ment include Medicare, CHIP, TRICARE for Life, and specified federal health care pro-
grams for veterans and Peace Corps volunteers. Minimum Essential Coverage,
OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/minimum-essential-coverage/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2015).
12. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012); see Minimum Essential Coverage, supra note 11.
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The portion of the ACA providing for the Medicaid Expansion was
enacted pursuant to the Constitution’s Spending Clause, which authorizes
Congress to spend federal revenues to “provide for the . . . general Wel-
fare of the United States.”13 Under this power, Congress can expend fed-
eral revenues for any purpose related to the “general welfare,” including
matters over which it has no regulatory authority.14 Congress has used
the Spending Clause to assume a regulatory role in numerous matters
outside its enumerated legislative authority by offering federal funds to
the states conditioned on the states’ taking actions to further federal pol-
icy choices.15 Implementation of the federal policy choices occurs only in
states that agree to accept the conditioned federal funds,16 but state rejec-
tion of proffered federal funds is not common.17
The Medicaid program, enacted in 1965 to provide health insurance
coverage for certain categories of needy persons,18 has been implemented
in every state.19 It is among the largest and most costly programs adminis-
tered by the states.20 Federal Medicaid funds received by the states make
up over 10% of most states’ budgets.21 These federal funds cover be-
tween 50% and 83% of the program’s cost, with the remainder being
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2601 (2012).
14. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
15. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–02.
16. See id. at 2601–03.
17. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL AID TO
STATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2011pubs/fas-10.pdf (showing federal aid to each state by program, with few gaps that
would indicate a lack of funding for any state in education, health, human services, trans-
portation, and other key federal grant programs). For discussion of the limited situations in
which states have turned down conditioned federal funds, see infra text & notes 166–69.
For discussion of objectionable conditions that have nevertheless been accepted by states
in order to receive federal grants funds, see infra text & notes 122–30.
18. As originally designed, Medicaid supplemented four existing programs that pro-
vided cash assistance to needy persons, providing those same individuals with coverage for
certain medical expenses. The four programs were Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren, Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Dis-
abled. Medicaid was eventually delinked from these four programs, though it continued to
focus on the categories of needy persons that they served: families with dependent chil-
dren, the elderly, blind, and disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(III)–(VIII)
(2012). Beginning in 1988, coverage of children and pregnant women was expanded by
raising the income eligibility threshold for these groups. Further modifications of eligibil-
ity, coverage, and other requirements have been made from time to time. See NFIB, 132 S.
Ct. at 2631 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dis-
senting in part).
19. The only holdout, Arizona, had declined to accept the Medicaid program when
originally offered in 1965. In 1982, the state finally capitulated to pressure from county
governments, which were having to shoulder the cost of providing health care to the poor,
and agreed to accept federal Medicaid dollars. Suzy Khimm, Will states really turn down
federal money? They’ve done it before, WASH. POST (June 29, 2012, 2:03 PM), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/06/29/will-states-really-turn-down-federal-
money-theyve-done-it-before/.
20. State Expenditure Report, NASBO 46 (2014), http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/
files/state%20Expenditure%20Report%20%28Fiscal%202012-2014%29S.pdf.
21. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2581.
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borne by the state.22
The ACA dramatically expanded the population of needy persons who
were eligible for Medicaid.23 Although the share of the costs to be pro-
vided by the federal government was unusually generous,24 the costs to
be borne by states were not insignificant.25 States’ freedom to reject this
federal offer was limited by the fact that implementation of the Medicaid
Expansion had been made a condition for receipt of the Medicaid grant
as a whole;26 hence, failure to participate in the expansion could result in
forfeiture of funding for the entire Medicaid program.27
A lawsuit challenging the Medicaid Expansion was filed by twenty-six
states that objected to the burdens imposed on states by the legislation,
but felt compelled to accept the expansion if failure to do so would result
in loss of all Medicaid funding.28 They argued that the choice they were
given—expand the Medicaid program or forfeit all Medicaid funding—
was coercive and in excess of Congress’s authority under the Spending
Clause.29
Ruling on the case in NFIB, a divided Supreme Court found no consti-
tutional infirmity with the ACA provisions creating, defining, and provid-
ing funds for the Medicaid Expansion.30 However, the Court struck down
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2012). The amount of the federal share is calculated
using a formula that is based on the state’s per capita income.
23. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2581–82; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VII) (2012); Kai-
ser Family Found., Where Are States Today? Medicaid and CHIP Eligibility Levels for Chil-
dren and Non-Disabled Adults, KFF.ORG (Mar. 2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files
.wordpress.com/2013/04/7993-03.pdf. The package of benefits that this group could receive
through Medicaid was different from the package provided to other Medicaid recipients,
tracking instead the “essential health benefits” package that the ACA established as its
health insurance benchmark. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u-7(b) (2012).
24. For the first three years, the federal government would pay 100% of the cost of
medical assistance for the newly eligible group, with the federal share gradually decreasing
to 90% by 2020. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (2012). The federal government pays 50% of
administrative costs in both the original and expanded Medicaid programs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396b(a) (2012). It will, however, pay 90% of certain expenses related to upgrading infor-
mation systems for making eligibility determinations. See Federal Funding for Medicaid
Eligibility Determination and Enrollment Activities, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,950-01, 21,950 (Apr.
19, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 433).
25. Brief for Respondents at 10, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 648
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 441267, at *10. Some analyses demon-
strated that  all costs to the states would be offset by savings elsewhere in the program, id.
at *11, though the existence and amount of such savings were subject to dispute. See, e.g.,
Edwin Park, CBO Finds Health Reform’s Medicaid Expansion Is an Even Better Deal for
States, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/
index.cfm?fa=view&id=4131.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012).
27. If the Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services finds, after notice
and a hearing, that a state is not in substantial compliance with any requirement, the Secre-
tary may withhold from the state all further payments or, at his discretion, may withhold
payments in regard to portions of the state plan that are affected by the noncompliance. 42
U.S.C. § 1396c (2012). By regulation, the Secretary will make reasonable efforts to resolve
issues of noncompliance with the state before initiating a hearing. 42 C.F.R. § 430.35
(2009).
28. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580, 2601 (2012).
29. Id. at 2601.
30. Id. at 2608.
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the threat to withdraw all Medicaid funding from any non-accepting
state.31 The Court held that threatening to penalize non-participating
states by withholding not just the new funds associated with the expanded
class of beneficiaries, but each state’s entire Medicaid grant,32 placed an
unconstitutional level of pressure on states to implement the Medicaid
Expansion.33 Hence, provisions of the ACA providing for this penalty
were invalid.34 Under the Court’s ruling, a state’s decision to reject the
Medicaid Expansion could have no effect on funds for the original Medi-
caid program.35 Rather, rejection of the Expansion would simply mean
that the state would not receive the new funding made available by the
ACA.36
The NFIB ruling on the Medicaid Expansion had a dramatic effect on
the health care reform package envisioned by the ACA.37 It substantially
reduced the inducement for the states to participate in the expanded
Medicaid program and, indeed, almost half of the states have declined to
accept the federal Medicaid Expansion funds.38 A substantial gap was
thereby created in the near-universal coverage for “essential health bene-
fits” that was envisioned by the ACA.39 In states that decline Medicaid
Expansion, persons with incomes below 138% of the federal poverty
31. The majority holding that the Medicaid Expansion could not be made a condition
for receipt of the entire Medicaid grant consisted of an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts
joined by two other Justices, and a joint dissenting opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito. The latter opinion will be referred to as the dissent or the joint dissent.
Justice Roberts and the dissenters agreed on the unconstitutionality of the Medicaid Ex-
pansion as included in the Act. However, whereas the joint dissenters would invalidate the
Medicaid Expansion itself on this ground, the Chief Justice would invalidate only the pro-
visions linking the Expansion with receipt of funds for the original Medicaid program. On
this point, the three Justices participating in the Chief Justice’s opinion were joined by two
Justices who would uphold all aspects of the Medicaid Expansion. NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
2608–09 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Because this Article is concerned with issues
related to the validity of conditioning the original Medicaid grant on implementation of the
Medicaid Expansion, references to “the majority” or “the Court” will encompass the two
opinions making up the majority on this issue—those of the Chief Justice and the joint
dissenters.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012). As noted by Justice Ginsburg, noncompliance would not
necessarily result in loss of the entire Medicaid grant. The Secretary has discretion to de-
termine the size of the penalty, and could be expected to yield to political pressure to limit
the size of the withholding. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641–42 n.27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).





38. Bruce Japsen, About Half U.S. States Will Expand Medicaid Under Obamacare,
FORBES, (July 27, 2013, 10:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2013/07/27/
about-half-u-s-states-will-expand-medicaid-under-obamacare/. An October 2013 count by
the federal government identified twenty-six states that were not expanding Medicaid.
Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Millions of Poor Are Left Uncovered by Health
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2013), at A1, available at www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/health/
millions-of-poor-are-left-uncovered-by-helath-law.html?pagewanted=all&_rl&. Updated
data can be found at www.commonwealthfund.org/interactives-and-data/maps-and-data/
Medicaid-expansion-map.
39. Tavernise & Gebeloff, supra note 38.
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guidelines who fail to qualify for traditional Medicaid40 are eligible
neither for publicly funded insurance nor for the federal subsidies that
assist persons with somewhat higher incomes in purchasing private
insurance.41
The NFIB ruling is notable also for signaling a potentially dramatic
shift in the principles under which the Court determines the constitution-
ality of Spending Clause enactments. Prior to NFIB, there was considera-
ble doubt as to whether the Court accepted coerciveness as a basis for
invalidating congressional grant programs.42 Certainly no federal law had
ever been struck down, or even seriously questioned, on this basis.43 Af-
ter NFIB, uncertainty no longer exists on this point.44 In opinions that
emphasized the importance of state sovereignty to our constitutional sys-
tem, seven of the nine Justices used a coerciveness analysis as the basis
for invalidating the Medicaid Expansion condition45 as in excess of Con-
gress’s spending authority.46
However, beyond these basic points, there was little agreement be-
tween the two groups of Justices comprising the majority.47 The opinions
contained several useful forms of analysis that have not played a promi-
nent role in recent Spending Clause jurisprudence, including a more strin-
gent examination of both the germaneness of the condition and the
voluntariness of the states’ acceptance thereof.48 However, no particular
form of analysis received support from a majority of the Justices.49 More-
over, the significance of any of the factors discussed by the Justices to an
overall assessment of the constitutionality of spending conditions was not
clear.50 Consequently, although the NFIB opinions seemed to signal a
40. The income levels at which a person is eligible for Medicaid are set by each state,
and often fall far short of the federal poverty guidelines. For parents, the eligibility cutoff is
less than the federal poverty level in thirty-three states, and is less than half of the poverty
level in sixteen states. Non-disabled adults without dependent children are not covered by
Medicaid in the majority of states. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601; Kaiser Family Found.,
supra note 23.
41. Under the ACA, substantial federal subsidies are available to persons with family
incomes below 400% of the federal poverty guidelines who purchase private insurance on
the new health care exchanges. These subsidies are not available to persons eligible for
traditional or expanded Medicaid. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 1401 (2010). One analysis of census data concludes that this gap in
coverage will encompass two-thirds of the poor blacks and single mothers in the United
States and more than half of the nation’s uninsured, low-wage workers. Tavernise &
Gebeloff, supra note 38.
42. See infra notes 79–86 and accompanying text.
43. E.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (regarding U.S. Supreme Court).
44. See id. at 2608 (majority opinion).
45. The “Medicaid Expansion condition” refers to the condition requiring all states
receiving Medicaid funds to participate in the expansion.
46. Kaiser Family Found., A Guide to the Supreme’s Court’s Decision on the ACA’s
Medicaid Expansion, KFF.ORG 1, 4 (Aug. 2012), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.word
press.com/2013/01/8347.pdf.
47. See id. at 4–5.  In re the “two groups,” see supra note 31.
48. See id. at 5–7.
49. See id. at 8.
50. See id.
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new direction in Spending Clause jurisprudence, it is uncertain what that
new direction is. Indeed, the Court’s repeated emphasis on the unusual
size of the Medicaid grant as the source of its coerciveness invites charac-
terization of NFIB as being sui generis.51
By examining the strains of constitutional jurisprudence upon which
the NFIB analyses were constructed, this article will attempt to create a
better understanding of their meaning and the opportunities they present
for a more nuanced and constitutionally sound approach to congressional
authority under the Spending Clause. An initial examination of the Su-
preme Court’s Spending Clause jurisprudence will reveal the evolution of
a highly deferential, contract-based approach that provided the context
for the NFIB decision. The theoretical and practical flaws in this ap-
proach will be explored, demonstrating its deleterious effect on the core
constitutional values of federalism and liberty and leading to the conclu-
sion that loosely conceived contract principles are inadequate to safe-
guard these fundamental constitutional values. The heightened concern
of the Roberts Court for these values, and their impact on the NFIB
Court’s partial break with prior Spending Clause jurisprudence, will be
examined in detail. It will be shown that NFIB, despite its talk of liberty
and federalism, fails to embrace the type of analysis necessary to preserve
these values. Proposals will be advanced for further development of the
doctrinal innovations suggested or implied by NFIB to create clear, co-
herent, and constitutionally based analyses capable of meaningfully dif-
ferentiating permissible conditions from those that intrude too deeply
upon state prerogatives.
II. SPENDING CLAUSE ANALYSIS IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. SPENDING CONDITIONS AND THE EXPANSION
OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
The Spending Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the power to
collect taxes and to expend revenues “for the common Defence and gen-
eral Welfare of the United States.”52 After 150 years of debate on the
issue,53 the Supreme Court held in United States v. Butler that the Spend-
ing Clause authorizes expenditures for any aspect of the general welfare,
whether or not it falls within the areas of federal regulatory authority
enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution.54 The Court has since recog-
nized that congressional expenditures may take the form of grants to the
states and that Congress has the power to attach conditions to those
51. See id. at 4.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
53. The debate went back to a dispute between James Madison, who advocated the
narrower position that Congress could tax and spend only in furtherance of its enumerated
powers, and Alexander Hamilton, who argued for the broader federal power. See United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936).
54. Id. at 66.
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grants.55 Thus, as summarized in South Dakota v. Dole, “objectives not
thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields,’ may never-
theless be attained through the use of the spending power and the condi-
tional grant of federal funds.”56 These rulings, together with the dramatic
increase in federal revenues made possible by the Sixteenth Amend-
ment’s authorization of a federal income tax57 and the activist political
philosophy prevalent during much of the twentieth century, have paved
the way for enactment of a broad array of federal grant programs that use
conditions to control state laws and practices in areas over which Con-
gress would not otherwise have authority.58
The Butler case, decided in 1936, held in check the potentially vast au-
thority of Congress under the Spending Power by counterposing against it
a robust Tenth Amendment limitation.59 Although recognizing the
breadth of a congressional power to spend federal revenues in further-
ance of the general welfare, the Court held that this authority did not
encompass a power to regulate in areas of reserved state authority.60
Consequently, conditions that intruded too far upon powers reserved to
the states could be struck down as contravening the structural federalism
represented by the Tenth Amendment. 61
Subsequent to Butler, however, judicial deference to congressional ex-
ercise of the Spending Power expanded, and the strength of the Tenth
Amendment limitation diminished. Cases decided between 1937 and 1987
allowed wide latitude for congressional grant conditions, so long as the
conditions were reasonably related to the general welfare.62 As predicted
by the Butler Court and reiterated by various Justices since that time, the
absence of substantive limits on congressional legislation under the
Spending Clause, such as those provided by the Tenth Amendment, has
55. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593–98 (1937). A parallel development
was a dramatic decline in the Court’s discussion of whether the “welfare” sought to be
furthered through a federal spending program  must be national rather than local, as defer-
ence to Congress in this area had become virtually conclusive. Compare Davis, 301 U.S. at
586–87, with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987).
56. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citations omitted).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
58. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2658 (2012) (joint
dissent).
59. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68–70 (1936).
60. Id. at 69–70. The Court distinguished between permitted means (the broad power
to spend in furtherance of the general welfare) and prohibited ends (intrusion upon areas
reserved to the states), quoting the classic language from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819): “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are con-
stitutional.” Butler, 297 U.S. at 69. Because the Court found the ends not to be legitimate,
Congress was barred from attempting to achieve those ends regardless of whether the
means fell within its powers. Id.
61. Id. at 69–70.
62. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 405 (1981); id. at 414 (listing cases
that approved onerous financial penalties for noncompliance with conditions); id. at 413
(listing cases that approved conditions that could be said to interfere with state
sovereignty).
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created the potential for Congress to transcend the bounds of its dele-
gated powers “to become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no
restrictions save such as are self-imposed.”63
B. VOLUNTARINESS AS THE TOUCHSTONE OF
SPENDING CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Under the legal regime used by the Court after 1937, federal spending
measures came to be treated as quasi-contractual in nature, subject only
to such limits as might arise under contract law.64 Conditions that in-
truded upon the states’ reserved authority were deemed acceptable be-
cause they were not imposed on the states as mandates, but instead were
voluntarily assumed by states when those states accepted the federal
grant funds.65 Theoretically, a state could avoid the federal requirements
simply by declining the federal funds to which they were attached as
conditions.66
This approach to Spending Clause analysis was solidified in the leading
case of South Dakota v. Dole, decided by the Supreme Court in 1987.67
Although the Dole Court gave lip service to a diverse list of limits on the
spending power, its interpretations of these limits effectively neutered all
but those related to the voluntariness of the state’s acceptance of the con-
ditioned funds.68
Limitations going to the substance of permissible conditions were inter-
preted so narrowly as to be essentially irrelevant. For instance, while
identifying “other constitutional provisions ” as a limitation on spending
measures,69 the Court rejected any notion that these limits included pro-
visions related to federalism, such as the Tenth Amendment’s reservation
to the states of undelegated powers70 and the Twenty-first Amendment’s
limits on federal regulation of alcohol.71 As to the textual requirement
that spending measures be in pursuit of the “general welfare,” the Court
stated that determining the general welfare is so far within the discretion
of Congress that it is questionable whether it is a judicially enforceable
63. Butler, 297 U.S. at 78, quoted in, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216
(1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2659 (joint dissent); Davis v. Monroe
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 655 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); accord NFIB, 132 S.
Ct. at 2578 (stating that powers granted to the Federal Government “must be read care-
fully to avoid creating a general federal authority akin to the police power”).
64. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602; id. at 2659–60 (joint dissent).
65. Id. at 2602 (majority opinion).
66. See, e.g., id. at 2603.
67. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (majority opinion).
68. See id. at 210–12.
69. Id. at 208.
70. Id. at 210.
71. Id. at 209. The Court held that the “independent constitutional bar” criterion was
applicable only where a condition would require states to engage in unconstitutional activ-
ity, such as invidious discrimination or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
at 209–11.
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restriction at all.72
Finally, the Court referenced a requirement that spending conditions
must be related to the federal interest in the project for which funds are
granted and its overall objectives.73 Because Congress’s conditioning au-
thority derives from its need to assure that funds granted to states are
spent as intended, permitted conditions had traditionally been limited to
those directing how the funds were to be managed and spent.74 The Dole
Court, however, transformed this limitation into a requirement merely
that the condition be related to the purpose of the federal grant.75 In
Dole, a condition requiring states to adopt a minimum drinking age of
twenty-one had been attached to federal highway construction grants to
the states.76 The Court found a sufficient relationship between the condi-
tion and the funded activity in the fact that both the highway construction
program and the uniform drinking age were at least partly intended to
promote safe interstate travel.77 As pointed out by Justice O’Connor in
her dissent, this view of the relationship requirement is sufficiently broad
that it would allow Congress to “effectively regulate almost any area of a
State’s social, political, or economic life on the theory that use of the
interstate transportation system is somehow enhanced.”78
After Dole, any limitations on the substance of federal spending condi-
tions had been marginalized, along with the federalism concerns that un-
derlie them. The only viable limitations that remained were those related
to assuring that states’ acceptance of the conditions was voluntary: a re-
quirement that conditions be clearly stated and a requirement that the
inducement to accept the conditions not be coercive.79
Even the coercion limitation was viewed narrowly by the Dole Court.80
The Court characterized the fiscal inducement to enact the uniform
drinking age as “relatively mild encouragement”81 rather than coercion,
since “all South Dakota would lose if she [declines to adopt the federally
preferred drinking age] is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under
specified highway grant programs,”82 an amount in the area of $3.5 mil-
lion annually.83 Cases subsequent to Dole have been similarly unrecep-
72. Id. at 207 n.2 & 208. Early authorities, including Alexander Hamilton, had drawn a
distinction between the national welfare and the local welfare, limiting federal spending
authority to the former. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1936).
73. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
74. See id. at 213–14.
75. See id. at 207.
76. See National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
77. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09.
78. Id. at 215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 207–08 (majority opinion) (“Our decisions have recognized that in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass
the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”). Id. at 211.
80. See id. at 211–12.
81. Id. at 211.
82. Id.
83. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5–6, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), 1987
WL 880327 at *4.
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tive to arguments that a federal grant program operates coercively,84 and
it was widely believed prior to NFIB that coercion was not in fact an
independent limitation on the spending power.85 Indeed, no federal stat-
ute had ever been struck down on this ground. 86
To the extent that any limitations on spending conditions survived
Dole, then, they related only to a loosely perceived concept of voluntari-
ness.87 The notion of conditioned federal grants as contractual in nature,
thus, came to dominate Spending Clause jurisprudence.88
III. CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES AND SPENDING CLAUSE
ANALYSIS: FEDERALISM, LIBERTY,
AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Although the contract analogy has a superficial appeal, it fails to cap-
ture principles that should play a central role in defining the parameters
of Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause. The relationships be-
tween the federal government, the states, and the citizenry implicate con-
stitutional values far more fundamental to our system of government
than the policies that underlie contract law and cannot adequately be ad-
dressed by appeal to contract principles. Unlike the typical contracting
party, a state is a sovereign entity under our Constitution, possessing at-
tributes and responsibilities that cannot be simply traded away.89 There
must necessarily be limitations on state contracting activity that arise
from this status. Yet, the prevailing approach to Spending Clause analysis
allows all concerns about federalism, state sovereignty, and liberty to be
subsumed into an inquiry into whether states’ acceptance of the federal
spending conditions is voluntary.90
The federalism inherent in the U.S. Constitution was not simply a
structural innovation necessitated by the politics of the post-revolution-
ary era; rather, it was seen as a fundamental guarantor of the liberty that
was and is central to American political thought.91 Believing that concen-
trated power is a breeding ground for tyranny,92 the Framers dispersed
84. E.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201–02 (10th Cir. 2000); see Con-
necticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 492 n.19 (D. Conn. 2006) (listing circuits that
have rejected the coercion analysis and those that have “been reluctant to dismiss coercion
claims out of hand”).
85. Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of
Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 588 (2013).
86. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2634 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 2659–60 (joint dissent).
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
90. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602–03 (2012) (“The legitimacy of Congress’s
exercise of the spending power ‘thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly
accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’ Respecting this limitation is critical to ensuring that
Spending Clause legislation does not undermine the status of the States as independent
sovereigns in our federal system.”); accord id. at 2659–60 (joint dissent).
91. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (clarifying that the Constitution was adopted to “secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity”).
92. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).
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power and placed checks on its exercise.93 The federalist system that they
devised envisioned two distinct sovereign entities, the states and the na-
tional government, each directly representative of, accountable to, and
with regulatory power over persons within their respective jurisdictions.94
Division of power between the state and national governments, like dis-
persion of power among the different branches of government, was a
manifestation of this strategy of dispersing power to protect the liberty of
the people.95 Federalism and state sovereignty thus stand beside “separa-
tion of powers” and “checks and balances” as foundational principles in-
tegral to the government structure of the Union.96 The relationship
between federalism and liberty appears repeatedly in the opinions of the
Supreme Court,97 including Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB.98
Preventing concentrations of power is not the only way that federalism
promotes liberty. Allocating power over most domestic issues99 to a sov-
ereign entity that is smaller and closer to the people promotes responsive-
ness, accountability, and citizen involvement100—all hallmarks of the
republican form of government that is the cornerstone of American lib-
erty. The remoteness of the central government distances federal
lawmakers from local problems and limits opportunities for public partic-
ipation in federal lawmaking processes.101 Consequently, laws enacted at
this level often bypass local priorities, generate unintended and undesir-
able consequences, impose one-size-fits-all approaches on a diverse na-
tion, and favor nationally active interest groups rather than local
publics.102 It was in recognition of such concerns that Madison noted in
The Federalist Papers: “[I]t is only within a certain sphere that the federal
power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered.”103
93. See id.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
95. After explaining in The Federalist No. 51 how separation of powers places a check
on usurpation of power by any official or branch of government and is thus “essential to
the preservation of liberty,” Madison described how this salutary effect was magnified by
the federalism embodied in the Constitution. “In the compound republic of America, the
power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.
Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison).
96. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991).
97. See, e.g., Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181
(1992); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457–59.
98. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (citing New
York, 505 U.S. 144).
99. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
100. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
101. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. For a detailed comparison of the opportunities for
citizen involvement in state and federal legislative processes, see Elizabeth G. Patterson,
Unintended Consequences: Why Congress Should Tread Lightly When Entering the Field of
Family Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 399 (2008).
102. Patterson, supra note 101, at 410–24.
103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison).
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Conditioned grants and other federal measures that utilize state instru-
mentalities to effectuate federal policy have a particularly deleterious ef-
fect on accountability because they result in actions by state governments
that appear to the public to be the policy choices of state officials when in
fact those choices were made by Congress.104 The accountability of both
state and federal officials is thus diminished by public misdirection of the
credit or blame for particular decisions,105 and by state officials’ inability
to respond to the preferences of the local electorate.106
Another way in which liberty is enhanced by federalism is the legal
diversity that results from state control of laws affecting individuals. In a
heterogeneous society such as ours, locally enacted laws reflect the cul-
tural and economic differences among the states and their citizens.107 The
resulting diversity of state laws on particular subjects enables citizens to
promote their own liberty through choice of residence.108 Current issues
illustrative of this phenomenon include same-sex marriage and marijuana
use.109
These advantages have been recognized by the Supreme Court, which
has summarized them thusly:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people
numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that
will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous soci-
ety; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in gov-
ernment; and it makes government more responsive by putting the
States in competition for a mobile citizenry.110
Maintaining a robust federalism capable of safeguarding these values
requires that state sovereignty be respected, and that analysis of federal
encroachments be meaningful and attentive to their effects on important
aspects of state sovereignty.111
104. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03.
105. Id. at 2602; id. at 2660–61 (joint dissent); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
168–69 (1992).
106. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2660 (joint dissent).
107. See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 70–73 (2001).
108. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 107, at 72; Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under
Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 155 (1992).
109. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing
California’s pioneering medical marijuana statute as an example of the benefits of federal-
ism).  Both same-sex marriage and marijuana use have recently been authorized in some
states following years of nationwide bans; as a result, Americans with differing views con-
cerning these divisive issues have an increased freedom to reside within a compatible
socio-legal environment. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014).
110. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); accord Bond v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 584 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
111. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459 (“These twin powers [the state and federal gov-
ernments] will act as mutual restraints only if both are credible. In the tension between
federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.”).
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IV. VOLUNTARY CHOICE AS THE GUARANTOR
OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The Court’s standard answer to concerns about Spending Clause en-
croachments on state sovereignty has been that the state’s choice to ac-
cept a federal grant with its attached conditions is itself an exercise of
sovereignty.112 So long as the state’s acceptance is knowing and volun-
tary, the argument goes, its sovereignty remains intact.113 Though pos-
sessed of a logical neatness, this statement ignores not only the frailty of
the criteria used by the Court to determine voluntariness, but also the
nature of state sovereignty in our system of government, and the corro-
sive effects on that sovereignty that are inherent in the current system of
federal hegemony by condition.
A. ATTRIBUTES OF SOVEREIGNTY
The sovereignty of a state is primarily encompassed in its power of in-
dependent self-government. When they ratified the Constitution, the
American states ceded authority in certain areas to the national govern-
ment and declared that exercise of those powers superseded inconsistent
state laws.114 However, this delegation of authority affected only the
scope of the states’ sovereignty, not its essential nature.115 The Court has
repeatedly underscored the states’ continued sovereign status, identify-
ing—as essential attributes of that sovereignty—control of the structure
and operation of state governmental institutions,116 and the power to set
policy within the spheres of traditionally recognized authority.117
112. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602–03 (2012).
113. The voluntariness of the state’s choice is also put forward as a response to con-
cerns about accountability. E.g., id. at 2602 (“Spending Clause programs don’t pose this
danger [to accountability] when a state has a legitimate choice whether to accept the fed-
eral conditions in exchange for federal funds. In this situation state officials can fairly be
held politically accountable for choosing to accept or refuse the federal offer.”); id. at
2660–61 (joint dissent); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV.
1, 15 (2004) (“Voters . . . can surely understand that the state is acting because it is required
to by federal law.”). This argument assumes a detailed and sophisticated public awareness
of the origins of particular state laws, including the fiscal constraints that lead the state to
accept undesired conditions. This assumption is patently unrealistic—all the more so when
it is considered that each state administers not just one, but numerous, conditioned federal
grant programs. Cf. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2658 (joint dissent) (noting that in 2010 federal
grant funds constituted 37.5% of state and local government expenditures).
114. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
115. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997).
116. See generally Gregory, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). In Gregory, a state constitutional pro-
vision prescribing a mandatory retirement age for state judges was challenged under the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Court held that Congress could pre-
empt state choices concerning the qualifications of constitutional officers only by making
its intent to do so “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,” which it had not
done in regard to the application of ADEA to state judges. Id. at 460–61. Other matters
that the Gregory Court explicitly recognized as fundamental to self-government included
the structure and operation of the state’s government, the qualifications of those who exer-
cise government authority and the manner in which they shall be chosen, the qualifications
of voters, and the manner of conducting elections. Id. at 464–67.
117. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 779 (1982).
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Even in areas of unquestioned federal authority, the Court has not al-
lowed federal enactments to displace state regulation in core areas of
state sovereignty unless congressional intent to do so is clearly mani-
fested.118 Where the scope of federal power is less clear, the fact that
essential attributes of state sovereignty would be compromised by an as-
sertion of federal power should be taken as a sign that the permissible
scope of the delegated power has been exceeded.119 The Spending Power
is of the latter sort; indeed, the constitutional language on which it is
based says nothing about controlling, limiting, or regulating the states or
matters over which the states have authority.120
B. EROSION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY BY EXISTING CONDITIONS
An examination of conditions that have been accepted by the states in
exchange for federal dollars demonstrates the erosion of state sovereignty
that can occur under a laissez-faire approach to conditioned federal fund-
ing. Although the validity of federal spending conditions is grounded in
Congress’s authority to determine how federal funds will be spent and to
instruct grantees accordingly,121 conditions currently in effect in every
state range far beyond instructions on the use of conditioned funds. It is
common for federal funding conditions to demand widespread changes in
state policy, sometimes on matters only tangentially related to the expen-
diture of the federal funds.122 When a state accepts funds conditioned in
this manner, state regulatory authority becomes a mere conduit for fed-
eral commands.123
Furthermore, the mandates embodied in conditions often conflict with
state policy preferences. For instance, the requirement in the federal Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) that certain
juveniles be included in the sex offender registry conflicts with the poli-
118. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1996) (discussing the
Supremacy Clause and preemption); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544–45
(1994) (interpreting the Bankruptcy Code).
119. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing the scope of federal power under the Necessary & Proper Clause).
120. See id. at 152–53 (“It should be remembered . . . that the spending power is not
designated as such in the Constitution but rather is implied from the power to lay and
collect taxes and other specified exactions in order, among other purposes, ‘to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.’”).
121. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602–03; United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73–74 (1936); see Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 577, 590–94
(1937).
122. See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDER-
ALLY INDUCED COSTS AFFECTING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 20–22, 26–27 (Sept.
1994), available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/information/m-193.pdf
[hereinafter, ACIR, FEDERALLY INDUCED COSTS]; Scott G. Crowley, The Effects of the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments in Changing the Role of the States in the Federal
System, 1989 BYU L. REV. 145, 154–56 (1989).
123. In her dissent in Dole, Justice O’Connor argued that many of the requirements
attached to federal spending measures are nothing short of federal regulations mislabeled
as spending conditions. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).  O’Connor would allow such regulatory conditions only if they fell within Con-
gress’s delegated regulatory powers. See id.
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cies of some states concerning juvenile rehabilitation and confidential-
ity.124 Likewise, the structure of the federal work requirement in the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program makes it dif-
ficult for many states to use what they believe to be the most effective
mechanisms for moving welfare recipients into the workforce.125
Compliance with grant conditions may require changes in state stat-
utes, constitutions, and governmental structures. The federal child sup-
port enforcement grant, for instance, required changes in states’ laws
concerning, among other things, the confidentiality of records held by fi-
nancial institutions,126 the rules of evidence to be followed in paternity
proceedings,127 suspension of  occupational, hunting, and drivers’ li-
censes,128 and the circumstances under which an unmarried father’s name
could appear on a birth certificate.129 Other conditions of this grant pro-
gram required that certain functions previously allocated by states to the
judicial branch be performed instead by a state executive branch
agency.130
Viewing sovereignty in terms of its essential attributes, it can hardly be
gainsaid that federal funding conditions such as these have made substan-
tial incursions upon state sovereignty.
C. PRACTICAL LIMITS ON STATES’ FREEDOM TO REJECT
CONDITIONED FUNDS
The extent of the incursions on sovereignty inherent in so many fund-
ing conditions undermines the assertion that the federal policy choices
embodied in these conditions have been voluntarily accepted by the
states. A more searching examination of state voluntariness than that put
forward in Dole and its progeny is essential if the voluntariness inquiry is
to serve as a meaningful safeguard for the state sovereignty envisioned by
the Constitution.131
A meaningful examination of the voluntariness of state acceptance of
federal funding conditions must begin with a realistic conception of the
fiscal world within which state governments function, shaped by the na-
ture and scope of the responsibilities allocated to the states in the consti-
tutional scheme. As explained by James Madison in The Federalist:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
state governments are numerous and indefinite. . . . The powers re-
124. Donna Lyons, Down to the Wire, ST. LEGISLATURES, June 2011, at 26–29 available
at http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=j9v-XfmR8Wg%3D&tabid.
125. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Mission Dissonance in the TANF Program: Of Work,
Self-Sufficiency, Reciprocity, and the Work Participation Rate, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
369, 383–402 (2012).
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(17), (c)(1)(D)(ii)(I) (2012).
127. Id. §§ 666(a)(5)(F), (G), & (K).
128. Id. § 666(a)(16).
129. Id. § 666(a)(5)(D)(i).
130. Id. § 666(c)(1).
131. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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served to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and property of
the people . . . .132
In accordance with this design, the states traditionally have been re-
sponsible for matters most directly concerned with the people who live
within their borders, including domestic relations,133 education,134 crime
and corrections,135 and poverty relief.136 State activity in these areas grew
exponentially throughout the twentieth century as the role of government
expanded to include new areas such as universal public education,137 pro-
tection and rehabilitation of dependent and delinquent children, and new
forms of public assistance.138
The role of the federal government also expanded during this pe-
riod.139 The Great Depression of 1929 through 1939 gave rise to wide-
spread federal involvement in the national economy.140 Thereafter, other
issues with interstate implications, such as environmental protection and
enforcement of the Civil War Amendments’ equality guarantees, further
broadened the scope of federal government activity.141
Growth of government at the federal level was financed through the
newly authorized federal income tax.142 Although state governments also
132. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
133. See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). Regarding specific
functional responsibilities of state and local governments, see NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE
BUDGET OFFICERS STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 4 (2013), available at http://www.nasbo
.org/sites/default/files/State%20Expenditure%20Report%20%28Fiscal%202011-
2013%20Data%29.pdf.
134. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974).
135. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993).
136. See Note, Depression Migrants and the States, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (1940).
See generally Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
137. The advent of universal public education in the first half of the twentieth century
placed fiscal demands on state and local governments that came to be their single greatest
area of expenditure. See 12.b Financing State and Local Government, USHISTORY.ORG,
www.ushistory.org.gov/12b.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
138. John Joseph Wallis & Wallace E. Oates, Decentralization in the Public Sector: An
Empirical Study of State and Local Government, in FISCAL FEDERALISM: QUANTITATIVE
STUDIES 5, 8 (Harvey S. Rosen ed., 1988), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7882.
139. For its first 100-plus years, the activities of the federal government were quite lim-
ited in scope, focusing on national priorities such as defense and the national mail service.
Michael Schuyler, A Short History of Government Taxing and Spending in the United
States, Fiscal Fact, TAX FOUND. 4–5 (Feb. 19, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/
taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff415.pdf. The original division of responsibilities between
state and federal governments was such that, until the 1930s, state and local government
revenues and outlays were significantly greater than those of the federal government. Id. at
7–8.
140. Id. Even so, state and local government revenues and outlays continued to exceed
those of the federal government until 1940. Id. at 8.
141. Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: the Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 847–50, 869–70 (1979).
142. See, e.g., GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 1900-1912 263
(1958). Until 1917, the federal government was financed almost entirely by customs duties
and excise taxes. Schuyler, supra note 139, at 4–5. Until the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment in 1913, doubts about the constitutionality of a federal income tax limited its
use in generating revenue at the federal level. See generally Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). Unquestioned access to this potentially lucrative revenue
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had access to the income tax, its revenue potential for states was limited
by competition with the federal government for funds from this source.143
Therefore, in most states, income tax plays second fiddle to sales tax as a
source of revenue, with the sales tax being the primary source of tax reve-
nue.144 Revenue reasonably obtainable through the sales tax, however, is
subject to inherent social and economic constraints that do not similarly
affect the income tax.145 Moreover, the transactions on which states can
levy a sales tax, and the manner in which they collect it, have been limited
by federal legislation146 and judicial rulings147 that have substantially re-
source after 1913 provided financial support for increasingly higher levels of federal activ-
ity in response to the challenges of the twentieth century. See Schuyler, supra note 139, at
4–6.
143. ACIR, FEDERALLY INDUCED COSTS, supra note 122, at 24. Individual and corpo-
rate income taxes provide approximately 60% of total federal revenues. This figure would
be closer to 90% if payroll taxes intended to support Social Security and Medicare were
not included in the total. In 2010 federal income taxes consumed an amount equal to 9.3%
of GDP. TAX POLICY CENTER, THE TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK, I-1-1 (2009), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/TPC_briefingbook_full.pdf. States, in con-
trast, derive 17% of their total revenues from income taxes, or approximately 40% if trans-
fers from the federal government are excluded from total revenues. Id. In 2010, the total
amount of state income tax revenues was approximately $277 billion. Id. at IV-1-1. This
amount is just under 2% of GDP.
The joint dissent in NFIB acknowledged that the practical ability of states to levy their
own taxes is diminished by the heavy federal taxation that dominates the nation’s major
revenue sources. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 n.13 (2012)
(joint dissent); accord James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141 (1972); see also Crowley, supra
note 122, at 152–54 (Since passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, the federal in-
come tax has absorbed the bulk of the revenue that is reasonably available from income
taxation.).
144. See TAX POLICY CENTER, supra note 143, at IV-1-1. Nationwide, sales taxes pro-
vide 24% of state general revenues. Id. State income taxes are a secondary source of reve-
nue in most states, providing, cumulatively, 18% of state general revenues. Id. The fact that
28% of state general revenues are derived from federal transfers demonstrates how depen-
dent states are on federal grant funds. See id. For a state-by-state listing of the proportion
of tax revenues generated by each type of taxation, see Elizabeth Malm & Ellen Kant, The
Sources of State and Local Tax Revenues, Fiscal Fact, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2013), http://
taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff354.pdf.
145. The rates at which sales can be taxed are subject to more constraints than income
tax rates. For one thing, it is more difficult to build progressive features into a sales tax
system, and thus considerations related to avoiding over-burdening taxpayers must gener-
ally be measured against a single, and lower-income, threshold. Further, because sales
taxes directly affect the prices of taxable goods and services, the production of tax reve-
nues must be balanced against the economic health of the state’s retail and service sectors.
Not only will higher prices resulting from high sales tax rates negatively affect demand, but
they may place in-state vendors at a competitive disadvantage with vendors in other states
and online. See TAX POLICY CENTER supra note 143, at IV-1-1 to III-4-22.
146. The Internet Tax Freedom Amendments Act of 2007, which imposes a moratorium
on taxation of internet access and communication services through 2014, has been esti-
mated to cost the states $23.3 billion annually in sales tax revenue. ROBERT JAY DILGER &
RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40957, UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM
ACT: HISTORY, IMPACT, AND ISSUES 10 (2013). Congress is currently considering making
this moratorium permanent. At various times, other federal laws have also prohibited spe-
cific forms of taxation by state and local governments, ACIR, FEDERALLY INDUCED
COSTS, supra note 122, at 23, or penalized state and local government issuance of certain
types of revenue bonds. Id. at 24.
147. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318–19 (1992) (prohibiting states from
requiring out-of-state vendors to collect and remit sales taxes on internet sales to state
residents).
2015] Spending Power after NFIB 403
duced the revenue recoverable from this source.148
These limitations on state revenue sources become particularly critical
in times of economic downturn, when the need for public services in-
creases as revenues from both sales and income taxes decrease.149 Unlike
the federal government, most states have statutes or constitutional provi-
sions that prohibit deficit spending;150 therefore they are unable to
weather revenue shortfalls by borrowing.
The fiscal pressures on states are exacerbated by congressional mea-
sures that force state and local governments to use their limited revenues
to implement federal, rather than state, policy priorities.151 It is common
for federal statutes to impose “unfunded mandates” that require state or
local governments to take costly actions for which there is little to no
federal funding.152 These may take the form of direct mandates, such as
the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which extended
overtime and minimum wage requirements to public sector employees.153
Alternatively, they may take the form of changes in federal grant pro-
grams that increase program costs without a corresponding increase in
148. According to the National Governors Association (NGA), “Congress has increas-
ingly restricted the rights of states to determine their own tax structure,” by statutorily
limiting the permissible objects of state taxation. Governor Jim Douglas, Testimony before
The National Governors Association Economic Development and Commerce Committee,
NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-relations/
nga-testimony/edc-testimony-1/col2-content/main-content-list/april-15-2010-testimony—-
govern.html. The NGA adopted congressional non-interference with state revenue systems
as one of its policy priorities in 2012. Permanent Policy Principles for State-Federal Rela-
tions, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-re-
lations/nga-policy-positions/page-ec-policies/col2-content/main-content-list/principles-for-
state-federal-rel.html. Examples of additional federal restrictions on state revenue-generat-
ing authority can be found in Governor Douglas’s testimony, and in ACIR, FEDERALLY
INDUCED COSTS, supra note 122, at 23–24.
149. ACIR, FEDERALLY INDUCED COSTS, supra note 122, at 19; TAX POLICY CENTER,
supra note 143 at IV-1-19; U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTI-
CAL BRIEF 93-11, RECESSIONS MATTER FOR STATE TAX COLLECTIONS (1993).
150. ACIR, FEDERALLY INDUCED COSTS, supra note 122, at 16, 18.
151. DILGER & BETH, supra note 146, at 9.
152. In addition, Congress routinely requires as a condition of federal grants that re-
ceiving states match the federal funds with funds from state coffers. Although state accept-
ance of the federal grant signals general agreement with the policy objectives of the federal
program, the specific activities and expenditures required by the federal legislation may
not reflect state priorities for efficiently or effectively achieving those objectives. See, e.g.,
DILGER & BETH, supra note 146, at 6–7; ACIR, FEDERALLY FUNDED COSTS, supra note
122, at 5–7. Two-thirds of federal grant programs contain match or MOE (maintenance of
effort) requirements. Chris Edwards, Fiscal Federalism, CATO INST., (June 2013), http://
www.downsizinggovernment.org/sites/downsizinggovernment.org/files/fiscal-federalism
.pdf.
153. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
For instance, the International City Management Association estimated the annual costs at
over $1 billion to cities with a population of greater than 10,000. Supplemental Brief for
Appellants on Reargument at 5, Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2456 (1976)
(NOS. 74-878, 74-879). Partial lists of unfunded mandates can be found in U.S. ADVISORY
COMM’N. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MANDATES IN
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: A PRELIMINARY ACIR REPORT FOR PUBLIC REVIEW
AND COMMENT (Jan. 1996), available at www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/mandates.html, and
NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG., MANDATE MONITOR, available at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/
standing-committees/budgets-and-revenue/mandate-monitor-overview.aspx.
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the federal grant.154
Because of the limitations on their ability to raise revenue and apply it
to self-identified priorities, states face constant pressure to find the reve-
nue necessary to meet their important and escalating expenses.155 Thus,
they are highly susceptible to federal offers of funds that can be used to
meet needs falling within the realm of state authority and on which the
states place high priority.156 This pressure is particularly strong for poor
states, which have greater incidences of problems and a smaller tax base
with which to address those problems.157
The federal government, on the other hand, has access to vast re-
sources with which to purchase state cooperation with federal policy ini-
tiatives. Of all taxes paid to American governments, the federal
government collects over 60%, compared to the 22% collected by the
fifty states.158 Federal revenues generated by income tax alone average
nearly 10% of the annual gross domestic product (GDP).159 The amount
of tax revenue collected by the federal government appears sufficiently in
excess of federal needs160 that the federal government is able to transfer
over one-fifth of its revenue to state and local governments,161 much of
this in the form of conditioned grants pursuant to the spending power.162
As recognized by the joint dissenters in NFIB, federal taxation at this
level lessens the ability of states to raise sufficient tax revenue to fund the
activities for which state governments are responsible.163 The states’ com-
parative disadvantage in generating tax revenue underlies their suscepti-
bility to federal offers of conditioned funding. Faced with a federal offer
of conditioned funding for, e.g., a low-income housing program, a state
has three basic choices. First, it can forego creation of a program of this
type. On the other hand, the state can accept the offer and will then be
able to provide low-income housing to its residents—although at the cost
of ceding certain aspects of its governing authority to the federal govern-
ment. Lastly, if the state wishes to provide low-income housing for its
residents, but is unwilling to submit to the federal controls embodied in
the grant conditions, it will have to derive funding for the program by
154. See ACIR, FEDERALLY INDUCED COSTS, supra note 122, at 20.
155. See id. at 30.
156. See id. at 33.
157. See id.
158. TAX POLICY CENTER, supra note 143, at I-1-1. The remaining 17% of tax revenue
goes to local governments. Id.
159. Id. Income taxes generate between 50% and 60% of federal revenues. Id. at I-1-2.
If payroll taxes (comprising approximately 40% of federal revenues) and other taxes are
included, federal revenues will have averaged 17.9% of GDP over the past five decades. Id.
at I-1-1.
160. The term “federal needs” is used to refer to functions falling within Congress’s
enumerated legislative powers.
161. TAX POLICY CENTER, supra note 143, at I-1-1.
162. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL AID TO
STATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2011pubs/fas-10.pdf.
163. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2641 n.26 (2012) (joint
dissent).
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either increasing taxes or shifting funds from other state-funded activ-
ity.164 In either of the latter scenarios the burden on state taxpayers
would be magnified by the fact that their taxes are concomitantly paying
for both federal and state programs. The joint dissenters in NFIB de-
scribed the dilemma faced by states:
When a heavy federal tax is levied to support a federal program that
offers large grants to the States, States may, as a practical matter, be
unable to refuse to participate in the federal program and to substi-
tute a state alternative. Even if a State believes that the federal pro-
gram is ineffective and inefficient, withdrawal would likely force the
State to impose a huge tax increase on its residents, and this new
state tax would come on top of the federal taxes already paid by
residents to support subsidies to participating States.165
These fiscal realities help explain why there are so few examples of
states choosing to reject federal moneys,166 even when they view the con-
ditions and match requirements attached to the federal grant as onerous
or even counterproductive.167 Rejection of federal funds generally in-
volves  programs with  policy objectives on which states place low prior-
ity, or approaches that are viewed as ineffective or contrary to other
important state policies.168 Conversely, any substantial amount of funds
that will help states meet a compelling need related to core areas of state
responsibility is very difficult to turn down. Thus, the loss of all Medicaid
funds, as posited by the ACA, is a powerful threat not only because of the
amount of funds involved, but also because of the critical needs met by
164. Much of the funding for increased Medicaid costs caused by federally mandated
program expansions has come at the expense of funding for higher education. ACIR, FED-
ERALLY INDUCED COSTS, supra note 122, at v.
165. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–62 & n.13 (2012) (joint dissent).
166. A primary exception is Arizona’s refusal to accept Medicaid for the first seventeen
years of the program’s existence. During this time, Arizona’s counties were expected to
fund health care for the poor. Khimm, supra note 19.
167. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–62 & n.13 (joint dissent).
168. Funds may be rejected, even for a compelling need, if the required approach to
meeting that need is viewed as ineffective or contrary to important state policies. A num-
ber of states rejected federal funding for sex education after studies found that programs
using the required abstinence-only approach did not have a statistically significant effect on
teen sexual behavior. Marissa Raymond et al., State Refusal of Federal Funding for Absti-
nence-Only Programs, 5 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 44, 46 (2008), available at http://
www.cfw.org/Document.Doc?id=285. Additionally, thirty-three states declined to imple-
ment the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) because of
policy differences with the federal approach. Lyons, supra note 124. As a consequence,
they lost 10% of certain federal law enforcement assistance grants. Despite the priority
level of law enforcement for the states, both the amount and the potential uses of these
grant funds were extremely limited. In fact, some states estimated that the cost of compli-
ance would substantially exceed the loss occasioned by noncompliance. Id. See generally
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16929 (2006).
In contrast, serious state concerns about conditions attached to large grants for high-
priority programs generally are expressed through means other than rejection of funds,
such as resolutions, congressional testimony, or other forms of communication. For in-
stance, thirty state legislatures passed resolutions attacking the federal No Child Left Be-
hind legislation for undermining states’ rights. Edwards, supra note 152.
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those funds and the shortage of state dollars to meet those needs.169
These fiscal realities cast a long shadow over assertions that states’ ac-
ceptance of federal grants conditioned in ways that encroach upon re-
served state authority constitute voluntary cessions of power. The NFIB
opinions acknowledged these limitations on state voluntariness, but gave
them effect only in regard to the heavily funded Medicaid program.170
The analyses used were limited in scope and would not necessarily reach
far beyond the Medicaid context.171 Granted, federal Medicaid funds re-
present by far the largest dollar amount of any federal grant program.172
However, that does not mean that Medicaid is uniquely coercive, just that
it is particularly so. The factors that disable states from rejecting federal
mandates tied to the Medicaid grant also apply to many other federally
funded programs—including education, welfare, child support enforce-
ment, foster care, food assistance, and public health—which involve cen-
tral state responsibilities, the cost of which is difficult for states to sustain
on their own.
V. LIMITATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RELEVANCE
OF VOLUNTARINESS
The viability of the voluntariness analysis currently used by the Court
to determine the constitutionality of federal spending conditions173 is se-
riously undercut by its failure to give credence to the constraints that
limit state volition in making these decisions.  Even if the Court were to
rectify the shortcomings in the voluntariness analysis, however, that ap-
proach would remain inadequate for resolving the constitutional issues
raised when spending conditions impinge upon key elements of state
sovereignty.
Indeed, the voluntariness of a state’s choice to accept conditions that
erode its sovereignty is really beside the point.  Whether voluntary or not,
a unit of government created by the Constitution cannot, by agreement,
transfer to another such unit powers allocated to it by the Constitution.174
In New York v. United States, the Court elaborated on this principle, not-
ing that it applied equally to transfers of power among the branches of
the federal government or between the state and federal governments.175
169. For example, Florida Governor Rick Scott, a strong opponent of health care re-
form, stated in regard to the Medicaid Expansion: “While the federal government is com-
mitted to pay 100 percent of the cost, I cannot, in good conscience, deny Floridians the
needed access to health care.” Tia Mitchell & Steve Bousquet, Florida Gov. Rick Scott
Supports Medicaid Expansion, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 21, 2013, 8:15 AM), http://www
.miamiherald.com/2013/02/20/3244176/fla-medicaid-privatization-plans.html.
170. See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–04 (2012).
171. See id. at 2606–07.
172. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014 303 (2013).
173. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601.
174. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 597 (1937) (holding that states
may enter into agreements with Congress “if the essence of their statehood is maintained
without impairment”).
175. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992).
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The Constitution’s division of power among the three branches is
violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether
or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment. In
Buckley v. Valeo, for instance, the Court held that Congress had in-
fringed the President’s appointment power, despite the fact that the
President himself had manifested his consent to the statute that
caused the infringement by signing it into law. In INS v. Chadha, we
held that the legislative veto violated the constitutional requirement
that legislation be presented to the President, despite Presidents’ ap-
proval of hundreds of statutes containing a legislative veto provision.
The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the
“consent” of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby nar-
rowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.176
The Court went on to observe that the allocations of power in the Con-
stitution were designed to benefit the people rather than the states or
state officials.177 Consequently, state officials have no right to authorize
departures from these constitutional allocations.178
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political enti-
ties, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the
States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. State
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: “Rather, federalism secures to
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power.” . . . Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the
States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot
be ratified by the “consent” of state officials.179
This point was reinforced in the recent case of Bond v. United States,180
where the Court held that individual citizens have standing to challenge
federal statutes on grounds of conflict with the federalism principles of
the Constitution.181 Because of the role played by federalism in protect-
ing individual liberty, the Court held that the citizen litigant asserts his or
her own rights and interests, not those of the states, when the litigant
alleges that a federal enactment exceeds the powers granted to Con-
gress.182 State officials have no more power to relinquish sovereignty
than to waive any other protections of individual liberty embedded in the
Constitution.183
176. Id. (citations omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 181 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
180. 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011).
181. See id. The Court emphasized that the citizen litigant would have to meet other
standing requirements as well, notably the requirement of a personal stake in the contro-
versy. Id. at 2366.
182. Id. at 2363–64.
183. See id. at 2364.
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What these principles tell us is that federal funding conditions that
erode state sovereignty without specific constitutional authorization are
suspect, and they cannot be validated merely by state acceptance or con-
sent.184 Thus, a Spending Clause analysis that focuses on state consent to,
or acceptance of, intrusive spending conditions is incapable of protecting
state sovereignty and the constitutional values dependent on such
sovereignty.
VI. THE ROBERTS COURT REVISITS SPENDING
CLAUSE ANALYSIS
The Roberts Court seems to take seriously the threat posed to state
sovereignty by an unconstrained congressional spending authority.185 The
Court’s opinions reflect an effort to give more bite to the requirement of
voluntary state acceptance of federal funding conditions.186 However, it
has yet to move beyond voluntariness to place any kind of substantive
limit on Congress’s conditioning authority.
A. ARLINGTON CENTRAL AND THE CLEAR STATEMENT RULE
In 2006 the Court used the “clear statement” requirement to invalidate
a condition Congress sought to impose on states that accepted funds
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).187 Seem-
ingly a fairly straightforward statutory interpretation case, Arlington Cen-
tral asked whether non-attorney expert fees are recoverable as “costs” in
actions filed under IDEA.188 The statutory text was silent on the issue,
though there were indications in the legislative history and elsewhere that
Congress had intended these expert fees to be recoverable.189 The Court
held that, contrary to general statutory interpretation practice, in Spend-
ing Clause cases the important factor is not what Congress intended, but
rather “what the States are clearly told regarding the conditions that go
along with the acceptance of [the federal grant] funds.”190 The statute
must be viewed
from the perspective of a state official who is engaged in the process
of deciding whether the State should accept IDEA funds and the
184. Congress is, of course, empowered to take actions that impinge on state sover-
eignty through its enumerated powers, their effect enhanced by the Supremacy Clause. See,
e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). This includes the power under the Spending
Clause to direct the management and use of federal grant funds. See South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
185. See Kaiser Family Found., supra note 46.
186. See id.
187. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).
188. Id. at 293–94.
189. The Conference Committee Report contained a statement directly on point, stat-
ing the conference’s intention that expert witness fees be recoverable. H.R. REP. No. 99-
687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), quoted in Murphy, 548 U.S. at 304. Other aspects of the
legislative history indicating that Congress had such an intent are discussed in Justice Sou-
ter’s dissent. Murphy, 548 U.S. at 309–12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 304 (majority opinion).
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obligations that go with those funds. We must ask whether such a
state official would clearly understand that one of the obligations of
the Act is the obligation to compensate prevailing parents for expert
fees.191
The Court concluded that a state official would not receive clear notice
of this obligation,192 and thus the Spending Clause provided no basis for
imposing it.193 This “clear statement” analysis had not been enunciated
by the Court in previous cases interpreting provisions of the IDEA nor
was it necessary to support the result desired by the Court.194 Moreover,
the question before the Court, liability for expert witness fees, was not
one that was likely to have influenced a state’s decision of whether to
accept or reject IDEA funds.195
In Arlington Central, the Court signaled a new seriousness about limit-
ing Congress’s spending power. This was the first case to break with the
extremely deferential approach that was seen in Dole, and appeared to be
a sign that the Roberts Court was contemplating a new direction in
Spending Clause analysis.
B. NFIB AND THE NEW SIGNIFICANCE OF COERCION
NFIB presented a further departure from Dole and its progeny when it
unconditionally embraced the coercion principle. Prior to NFIB, the com-
monly held view was that despite its mention in Dole,196 a “coercion”
inquiry was not part of the Spending Clause analysis established by that
case.197 In NFIB, however, both those who joined the Chief Justice’s
opinion and the joint dissenters—a total of seven Justices—held that ab-
sence of coercion is an essential feature of a valid spending condition.198
The seven NFIB Justices held that coercion renders consent illusory, thus
vitiating the basis for the constitutional legitimacy of the condition.199
Any uncertainty about whether the “coercion” language in Dole stated a
viable rule of decision was thus firmly resolved in the affirmative.200
191. Id. at 296.
192. Id. at 300.
193. See id. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
194. See id. at 304–08.
195. Id. at 303 (majority opinion).
196. After articulating its four-part Spending Clause test, the Court stated that “[o]ur
decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by
Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compul-
sion’.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
197. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2634, 2641 (2012)
(Ginsberg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part); Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1329–30 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Nevada v.
Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (1989).
198. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
199. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03; id. at 2660 (joint dissent).
200. Id. at 2604–05 (majority opinion). The Chief Justice and the joint dissent also re-
jected the federal government’s position that acceptance was voluntary so long as the
states were legally free to accept or reject the conditions. Both opinions endorsed and
applied the concept of fiscal coercion implicit in Dole’s statement that “the financial in-
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C. NFIB’S TWO COERCION ANALYSES AND THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Both the Chief Justice’s opinion and the joint dissenters concluded that
penalizing a state’s rejection of the Medicaid Expansion by withdrawing
its Medicaid grant was unconstitutionally coercive.201 However, the two
opinions used different analytical routes to arrive at this conclusion,
neither of which provide clear guidance on how broadly it might reach in
future cases.202
1. The Joint Dissenters’ “Sheer Size” Approach
The joint dissent’s holding that the Medicaid Expansion package of-
fered to the states by Congress was coercive was based on the “sheer
size” of the federal Medicaid grant,203 the entirety of which would be
placed in jeopardy by a state’s rejection of the Medicaid Expansion.204
ducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure
turns into compulsion’.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (emphasis added).
201. See Kaiser Family Found., supra note 46, at 8.
202. See id.
203. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663–64 (joint dissent). The dissenters argued that further evi-
dence of coerciveness could be found in Congress’s apparent assumption that every state
would have no choice but to implement the Medicaid Expansion. Id. at 2664–66. The ACA
sought to approximate a system of universal insurance coverage for a specified package of
“essential health benefits,” with coverage for low-income persons—those with incomes be-
low 138% of the federal poverty guidelines who did not qualify for existing federal health
insurance programs—to be accomplished through the Medicaid Expansion. Id. at 2601
(majority opinion); see also CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 9 (noting that the eligibility
threshold of 133% is effectively raised to 138%). Because the ACA contained no other
mechanism for providing coverage to this population, the dissenters inferred that Congress
must have believed the offer of conditioned funding for Medicaid Expansion to be one that
“no State could refuse.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2657 (joint dissent). Congressional beliefs and
expectations are odd criteria on which to base a finding of coercion, as coerciveness re-
flects the mental state not of Congress, but of the state that is purportedly coerced. Moreo-
ver, a congressional desire that states be unable to reject a grant program, and its intent
that this will be the case, is not uncommon, particularly with major federal program initia-
tives. State fiscal realities are understood by Congress, which rarely if ever discusses the
possibility that one of its significant spending programs might be rejected by one or more
states. Hence, a congressional expectation that all states would accept the Medicaid Expan-
sion fails to single out this offer as exceptional, with a coercive nature that is “unmistakably
clear.” Contra id. at 2662.
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012). “[M]ost states receive[d] more than $1 billion in
federal Medicaid funding” prior to the ACA, with “a quarter receiv[ing] more than $5
billion.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (joint dissent). The Chief Justice noted that pre-expan-
sion federal Medicaid funds accounted for more than 10% of the average state’s budget.
Id. at 2604–05 (majority opinion). The total of federal Medicaid grants to the states was
more than $270 billion, far in excess of the $37.6 billion spent on highway planning and
construction, the second largest federal grant program. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
supra note 172. Federal funds cover from 50% to 83% of a state’s Medicaid costs. NFIB,
132 S. Ct. at 2604. The specific percentage is determined by a formula based largely on the
state’s per capita income. See Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expendi-
tures; Federal Matching Shares for Medicaid, CHIP, and Aid to Needy Aged, Blind, or
Disabled Persons, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,061-01 (Nov. 30, 2011). The Court compared the loss of
funds that could be occasioned by rejection of the Medicaid Expansion with the penalty for
noncompliance with the drinking age requirement that was upheld in Dole: 5% of the
state’s federal highway funds, less than one-half of one percent of the state’s budget. NFIB,
132 S. Ct. at 2604. The penalty in Dole was characterized as a “relatively mild encourage-
ment” to accept the change in drinking age, id., leaving the state in NFIB with “the simple
expedient of not yielding to [the] federal blandishments.” Id. at 2603.
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The joint dissenters did not purport to define the outer limit of an analy-
sis based on “sheer size,” and their language is susceptible to the interpre-
tation that it encompasses no existing program other than Medicaid, with
its uniquely prodigious federal funding.205
2. The Chief Justice’s “Separate Programs” Approach
Like the dissenters, the Chief Justice placed parameters around the co-
ercion analysis that raise questions about its applicability to subsequent
cases. The Chief Justice’s conclusion that conditioning Medicaid funding
on compliance with the Medicaid Expansion was coercive arose from and
was dependent upon his characterization of Medicaid and of the Medi-
caid Expansion as two separate programs.206 This characterization was
based on differences between the preexisting Medicaid program and the
expansion regarding eligibility, funding, and other details,207 as well as
the fact that the Medicaid Expansion was part of a separate, comprehen-
sive set of interrelated health care reforms embodied in the ACA.208 In
the Chief Justice’s view, the threat to withhold Medicaid funds was being
used like a “gun to the head” to induce states to implement a new and
separate program.209 Had the Medicaid Expansion been interpreted as a
modification of the existing Medicaid program, it would not have been
susceptible to this analysis.210 Rather, the federal threat would amount to
no more than a statement that states unwilling to implement the newly
modified Medicaid program would not receive federal Medicaid funds—a
statement that is not inherently coercive.211
The “separate programs” analysis is a clever way to justify a desired
finding of coerciveness without radically changing existing Spending
Clause jurisprudence. The idea that it is coercive to threaten to withhold
funds from a strongly desired and heavily funded program in order to
bring about acceptance of a second program is consistent with coercion
205. Id. at 2663 (joint dissent) (“The States are far less reliant on federal funding for
any other program.”); id. at 2664 (“[T]he offer that the ACA makes to the States—go
along with a dramatic expansion of Medicaid or potentially lose all federal Medicaid fund-
ing—is quite unlike anything that we have seen in a prior spending-power case.”). In one
aspect, though, the dissenters’ analysis does expand on previous perceptions of the federal
spending measures to which a coercion analysis could apply. The dissenters’ analysis, with
its focus on the size of the conditioned grant, would appear to apply not only to a major
modification of the Medicaid program such as ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, but to any
modification of the program that is made a condition of the Medicaid grant, or to the
original Medicaid program itself. That this was the dissenters’ intent is indicated by an
example they give of constitutionally offensive spending: Congress offers an enormous ed-
ucation grant to the states, with conditions dictating a variety of minutiae relating to public
education in the state. See id.
206. Id. at 2605–06 (majority opinion).
207. Id. at 2605–06. Differences mentioned by the Chief Justice included the level of
federal match, coverage levels for recipients, and expansion of the program beyond speci-
fied categories of beneficiaries to the entire non-elderly, low-income population. Id.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 2640.
210. See id. at 2605.
211. See id.
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analyses found elsewhere in law and ethics.212 An analysis of this sort
could be productively employed in cases where it is clear that separate
programs are in fact involved—e.g., the conditioning of funds for the
TANF program on a state’s implementation of the federally legislated
Child Support Enforcement program.213
The Medicaid Expansion initiative, in contrast, was not designated or
treated as a separate program by Congress.214 Nor are there accepted
criteria other than congressional intent for determining the boundaries of
a “program.”215 The Chief Justice’s attempt to separate into two pro-
grams that which Congress had labeled as one not only invaded congres-
sional prerogatives, but also steered the Court into territory that it is
singularly ill-equipped to navigate. Thus, although it is easy to see the
“separate programs” concept being integrated into coercion analysis, an
independent judicial assessment of what qualifies as a “program” should
not form a part of that analysis. Moreover, the “separate programs” ap-
proach is of little utility in providing the needed constraints on congres-
sional spending conditions.  Even if the Chief Justice’s approach was
accepted in its entirety, it would apply to only a small portion of the many
federal programs using conditioned funding to control policy in areas of
traditional state control.
D. A TRANSITIONAL CASE?
Although seven of the Supreme Court Justices expounded on the con-
stitutional importance of federalism and state sovereignty in NFIB, they
failed to put forward an analysis that would be of continuing utility in
safeguarding those values against overly invasive spending conditions.
212. For instance, antitrust laws regard as suspect tying arrangements whereby a seller
conditions sale of one product on the buyer’s agreement to purchase a second product as
well. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 487 (1992).
213. Though not as heavily funded as Medicaid, TANF is nonetheless a “major federal
funding source.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664 (joint dissent); see OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, supra note 172 (showing federal obligations for major grant programs in FY2012
to FY2014). Unlike Medicaid and Medicaid Expansion, Child Support Enforcement and
TANF were designated and treated as separate programs by Congress, as well as by the
federal and state agencies charged with those programs’ administration. Indeed, in a num-
ber of states, the Child Support Enforcement and TANF programs are administered by
different agencies. Also unlike Medicaid and the Medicaid Expansion, TANF and Child
Support Enforcement employ vastly different tools to achieve distinct aims. Although mo-
tivated by the common purpose of providing economic support for low-income children,
the programs use distinct mechanisms for assuring such support: in one program, a transfer
of public funds to needy families; in the other, enforcement of an absent parent’s private
obligation of support. Accomplishment of these distinct missions requires vastly different
program activities. Compare What We Do, Office of Family Assistance, http://www.acf.hhs
.oov/programs/ofa/about/what-we-do, with OCSE Fact Sheet, Office of Child Support En-
forcement, http://www.acf.hhs.gov.programs/css/resource/ocse-fact-sheet.
The statutory scheme in Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996),
also presents a more legitimate case for a “separate programs” analysis. There, noncompli-
ance with provisions of the Clean Air Act was penalized not only by requiring stricter
permitting standards under that Act, but also by reducing the state’s federal highway fund-
ing. Missouri, 918 F. Supp at 1324.
214. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (majority opinion).
215. See id.
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Not only did no single analysis command a majority, but the analyses in
both opinions comprising the majority contained flaws and uncertainties
that make application outside the immediate context difficult. The
problems and limitations in the NFIB analyses could reflect either of two
alternative futures for Spending Clause jurisprudence. The Justices may
have been attempting to carve out an exception for the Medicaid pro-
gram, either because of its unique size or because of the controversy sur-
rounding the ACA. In that case, the analytical problems seen in the case
would have arisen from the difficulty of reaching the desired conclusion
with the analytical tools available through existing caselaw and would not
signal a generally applicable shift in the Court’s thinking. Alternatively,
NFIB may be a transitional case in which the Justices’ analytical struggles
reflect the early stages of a shift in the paradigm under which the validity
of congressional spending conditions is determined.
A transitional case is one that breaks with prior caselaw to initiate a
significantly different approach to a certain area of jurisprudence, but
without acknowledging that it is doing so. A narrow, and perhaps awk-
ward, analysis may be used to minimize the extent of the break with prior
precedent; later cases then abandon the constraints inherent in that anal-
ysis as the new paradigm is embraced. Examples of transitional cases are
Brown v. Board of Education216 in regard to the constitutionality of racial
segregation and Griswold v. Connecticut217 in regard to the constitutional
right to privacy. Brown v. Board of Education took the momentous step
of striking down school segregation without abandoning prior law that
upheld “separate but equal” facilities for blacks and whites.218 The Court
accomplished this by focusing on educational institutions and finding
that, in that context, “separate [was] inherently unequal.”219 Thereafter,
this focus on context disappeared as the Court struck down without com-
ment racial segregation in a variety of other settings and erased all ves-
tiges of the “separate but equal” doctrine.220
Similarly, the constitutional right to privacy, when initially recognized
in Griswold v. Connecticut, was strictly limited to the privacy of married
couples, a limitation that was deemed necessary to avoid reviving a dis-
credited line of cases that had given heightened constitutional protection
to certain aspects of liberty not explicitly enumerated in the Constitu-
tion.221 As in NFIB, the Justices comprising the Griswold majority used
different analyses as the basis for recognizing an unenumerated constitu-
216. 347 U.S. 482 (1954).
217. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
218. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
219. Id. at 493–95.
220. See, e.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam) (municipal audito-
rium); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per
curiam) (municipal golf course and parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per
curiam) (city buses); Mayor & City Council of Balt. City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(per curiam) (public bathhouses and beaches).
221. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499.
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tional right to privacy.222 However, all stressed that the protected right
was one of marital privacy.223 Shortly thereafter, the Court used an equal
protection theory to abandon the marital focus and recognize privacy as a
right possessed by all individuals.224
There is a reasonable likelihood that NFIB could also prove to be tran-
sitional. Certainly a substantial majority of the Court appears dissatisfied
with the pre-existing approach and ready to embrace an analysis that is
more jurisprudentially sound. The emphasis on state sovereignty and the
dangers of an overbroad federal spending power suggests an inclination
to fashion more meaningful limits on congressional discretion to use
spending conditions to control state governance. If that is the case, there
are two primary directions that the Court might take. One would be a re-
envisioning of the coercion analysis to better capture the practical reali-
ties of state decision-making. Although this would be an improvement on
the parsimonious approach to coercion in Dole225 and, to a somewhat
lesser extent, NFIB,226 it would still rest upon the flawed premise that
states have power to alter contractually the Constitution’s allocation of
governing authority. To address the most serious problems with the Dole-
era analysis—those that arise from the structure and language of the
Constitution itself—it will be necessary to substantively limit funding
conditions in a way that reflects the limited nature of federal power.
E. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO FISCAL COERCION
Although the opinions making up the NFIB majority are silent on the
potential breadth of their coercion analyses, they both suggest that the
spending measures to which those analyses might apply are few.227 This
view does not appear to be a reflection of analysis or ideology, but rather
a caution born of concerns related to justiciability.228 Courts are under-
standably hesitant to undertake a fiscal coercion inquiry that involves an
assessment of state fiscal capacities and choices, and several federal cir-
cuits have expressly questioned the justiciability of the coercion issue in
222. Id. at 484–86 (penumbras of the Bill of Rights); id. at 486–93 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring) (Ninth Amendment); id. at 500–01 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (Due
Process Clause: “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”); id. at 502–03 (White, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (Due Process Clause: fundamental liberties).
223. Id. at 486 (majority opinion); id. at 497–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 502–03
(White, J., concurring in the judgment).
224. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court stated, “It is true that in Gris-
wold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital
couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Id. at 453. Both the Griswold and Eisenstadt
cases dealt with access to contraceptives.
225. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
226. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus v. Sebelius. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–05 (2012).
227. See id. at 2603, 2634–35.
228. See id. at 2634–35.
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Spending Clause jurisprudence for this reason.229 The Ninth Circuit de-
tailed some of these concerns as follows:
Does the relevant inquiry turn on how high a percentage of the total
programmatic funds is lost when federal aid is cut-off? Or does it
turn, as Nevada claims in this case, on what percentage of the federal
share is withheld? Or on what percentage of the state’s total income
would be required to replace those funds? Or on the extent to which
alternative private, state, or federal sources of highway funding are
available? [S]hould the fact that Nevada, unlike most states, fails to
impose a state income tax on its residents play a part in our analysis?
Or, to put the question more basically, can a sovereign state which is
always free to increase its tax revenues ever be coerced by the with-
holding of federal funds—or is the state merely presented with hard
political choices?230
The Ninth Circuit concluded, “[t]he difficulty if not the impropriety of
making judicial judgments regarding a state’s financial capabilities ren-
ders the coercion theory highly suspect as a method for resolving disputes
between federal and state governments.”231
Concerns of this sort pose a major obstacle to development of a mean-
ingful fiscal coercion analysis. The NFIB dissenters expressly rejected the
argument that a fiscal coerciveness inquiry is nonjusticiable,232 arguing
that the importance of the federalism issues in Spending Clause cases de-
mands that the judiciary provide meaningful oversight.233
Howeverneither the joint dissent nor the Chief Justice’s opinion, which
combined to control the outcome on the Spending Clause issue, provides
any but the most minimal guidance on how a judicially manageable as-
sessment of fiscal coercion might be carried out.234
If the Court intends to use a coercion analysis as the mechanism for
providing meaningful oversight of congressional spending measures, it
needs to formulate a conception of coercion that is capable of realistically
capturing the dynamic of federal-state fiscal interactions in a broad range
229. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201–02 (10th Cir. 2000); Nevada
v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 447–48 (9th Cir. 1989); Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401,
413–14 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2640–41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
230. Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448; accord Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1202.
231. Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448.
232. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661 (joint dissent) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 175 (1992)). Cf. supra notes 163–69 and accompanying text.
233. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
234. The NFIB opinions were able to resolve the case using rudimentary concepts of
and approaches to fiscal coercion because of facts peculiar to the Medicaid context. The
Chief Justice, by manipulating the facts, was able to cast the Medicaid Expansion proposal
as a true threat, see supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text, a prototypical form of
coercion that obviates the need for a detailed examination of a state’s fiscal choices and
constraints. The joint dissent was able to avoid a detailed examination of state fiscal issues
by holding that the size of the grant, standing alone, was sufficient to establish coercive-
ness. Because the Medicaid grant is so much larger than any other federal grant, the utility
of this criterion outside the Medicaid context is uncertain. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (joint
dissent).
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of contexts. Moreover, this conception must utilize  criteria that are sus-
ceptible to judicial application.
It may be possible to formulate an analysis of this sort.  Models can be
found in the extensive literature exploring the idea of coercion in other
contexts such as medical ethics. The debate among medical ethicists con-
cerning the propriety of paying individuals to participate in medical re-
search raises coerciveness issues quite similar to those presented in
Spending Clause cases.235 In both the Spending Clause and medical re-
search contexts, an offer of money is used to induce the offeree to engage
in actions desired by the offeror, actions which may be detrimental to the
interests of the offeree.236 A conditioned offer of this sort can be seen as
coercive if the nature of the offer, or the circumstances in which it is
made, seriously undermine the voluntariness of the offeree’s choice to
accept the offer.237
In determining whether payment of research participants constitutes
coercion,238 medical ethicists, like the NFIB Justices,239 give substantial
weight to the size of the payment.240 It is recognized that the magnitude
of the payment alone may be sufficient to distort the offeree’s judg-
ment241 and induce him to disregard significant risks of harm or to sacri-
fice other important interests.242 A second factor considered in tandem
with the size of the offer is the neediness of the offeree.243 These two
235. See generally Ruth Macklin, ‘Due’ and ‘Undue’ Inducements: On Paying Money to
Research Subjects, 3(5) IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1 (May 1981), available at http://www
.jstor.org/stable/3564136?seq=1.
236. See generally id.
237. At least since the Nuremberg war crimes trials of 1945–1946, it has been an un-
questioned principle of medical ethics that participation in medical research must be volun-
tary and not induced by force or coercion. Macklin, supra note 235. One of the Nazi war
crimes was the forced use of prisoners in harmful medical experiments. Hence, coercion of
research subjects, which is commonly referred to as “undue inducement,” is prohibited by
federal regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2014), and by all leading codes of research ethics.
A. Wertheimer & F.G. Miller, Payment for Research Participation: A Coercive Offer?, 34 J.
MED. ETHICS 389, 389 (2008).
238. In the medical ethics literature, the term “undue inducement” rather than “coer-
cion” is used in regard to a coercive offer, with the term “coercion” being used only when
the inducement takes the form of a threat of harm. Whether a proposal takes the form of a
threat (“Your money or your life”) or an offer (“I will pay for your daughter’s life-saving
surgery if you will help me rob the bank”), it is coercive if it “generates pressure on the
coercee’s will that, if not irresistible, is sufficiently strong to make the coercee’s choice
unfree.” STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, “Coercion,” 17 (Oct. 27, 2011), avail-
able at plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/.
239. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (joint dissent) (concluding that the “sheer size” of the
Medicaid grant creates coercive pressure).
240. E.g., Macklin, supra note 235, at 1–2.
241. Distortion of the offeree’s judgment is the measure of undue inducement that is
endorsed in the handbook for Institutional Review Boards, the bodies charged with re-
viewing research proposals in each institution that conducts research. See Wertheimer &
Miller, supra note 237, at 391.
242. E.g., Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Clarifying Confusions About Co-
ercion, 35(5) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16, 18 (Sep.–Oct. 2005). This idea is reflected in the
NFIB joint dissent’s conclusion that the “sheer size” of the Medicaid grant creates coercive
pressure. See supra notes 202–05 and accompanying text.
243. E.g., Daniel Lyons, Welcome Threats and Coercive Offers, 50 PHILOSOPHY 425, 427
(1975); Jill A. Fisher, Expanding the Frame of ‘Voluntariness’ in Informed Consent: Struc-
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criteria represent the extent of present judicial thinking about coercion in
the Spending Clause context.244 However, analysis of voluntariness and
coercion in medical ethics literature is not limited to the size and attrac-
tiveness of the offered payment. An equally important indicator of poten-
tial coerciveness is the nature of the action sought from the offeree.245
Typical is one ethicist’s definition of coercive offers as “excessively attrac-
tive offers that lead people to do something to which they would nor-
mally have real objections based on risk or other fundamental values.”246
The hallmark of coercion is the negation of voluntary choice.247 As a
general rule, there is no reason to believe that a person, even a needy
person, who accepts a large sum of money conditioned on performance of
certain acts is acting other than voluntarily.248 Indeed, this description
encompasses the majority of ordinary consensual contracts, including
contracts of employment. An inference that the contract was anything
other than voluntary would arise only if the required acts were of a sort
to which a reasonable offeree would be unlikely to agree because they
are, e.g., illegal, dangerous, or contrary to fundamental religious or other
tural Coercion and the Power of Social and Economic Context, 23(4) KENNEDY INST. OF
ETHICS J. 355, 360 (Dec. 2013), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_
of_ethics_journal/v023/23.4.fisher.pdf. Connections between the offeror and the offeree’s
predicament may contribute to a conclusion that the offer is coercive. For instance, an
offeror’s knowing or intentional exploitation of an offeree’s vulnerability in order to obtain
assent not otherwise likely to be given may be classified as coercive. See, e.g., John McMil-
lan, Coercive Offers and Research Participation: A Comment on Wertheimer and Miller, 36
J. MED. ETHICS 383, 383 (2010). Similarly, coercion is likely to be found if the offeror
played a significant role in creating the circumstances that place pressure on an offeree to
accept the unwelcome offer. See, e.g., STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra
note 238, at 14–15. From these criteria an argument could be constructed that federal tax-
ing policies have played a substantial role in creating states’ fiscal vulnerability, which is
now being exploited by the federal government to gain policy control in areas of state
dominion.
244. It is the difficulty of assessing financial hardship that has caused courts to question
the justiciability of the coercion issue in Spending Clause challenges. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–04, 2606 (2012).
245. E.g., Lisa Newton, Inducement, Due and Otherwise, 4(3) IRB: ETHICS & HUM.
RES. 4, 4 (Mar. 1982).
246. Neal Dickert, Coercion and Undue Inducement in Research: Money and Other Of-
fers (2006), available at ocw.jhsph.edu/courses/ethicshumansubjectresearch/PDFs/Coercion
.pdf.
247. See Fisher, supra note 243.
248. In the context of research, see, for example, Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 237.
Additionally, the original offer of Medicaid funding provides a useful example. The joint
dissenters’ analysis would appear to classify this offer as coercive because of the “sheer
size” of the grant. However, though sizeable, this offer was not necessarily coercive be-
cause it provided funds for states to achieve goals that they shared with the federal govern-
ment. It had a potential to be coercive because of the inducement created by the
unprecedented amount of money offered and the importance to the states of the benefits
on which it could be expended. However, even an irresistible offer is not coercive unless it
induces, or is likely to induce, the offeree to take actions that would otherwise be resisted
because of conflict with core values. Without this feature, a federal funding initiative is
more like a gift to the states; the generosity of the gift does not change its character from
gift to coercive imposition. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2633 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part, con-
curring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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values.249 Identification of coercive offers thus requires examination not
only of the amount of money offered and its irresistibility to the targeted
offerees, but also of the onerousness to the offerees of the conditions
placed on receipt of the money. Accordingly, assessments of the coercive-
ness of payments to medical research subjects look closely at the risks of
physical or psychological harm that may be caused by submitting to an
untested treatment.250 The more significant these risks, the more likely
that the offer will be seen as one that would not voluntarily be accepted
by a reasonable person and which therefore should be viewed as coer-
cive.251 For states responding to an offer of federal funds, the fundamen-
tal value underlying resistance to the offer would normally be protection
of their sovereignty against federal encroachment.252 Thus, the coercive-
ness of an offer would be proportionate to the extent to which the state
would be required to acquiesce in federal control of matters such as the
structures and processes of state government or policy choices in areas of
state authority.
Incorporating an “effect” criterion of this sort into our thinking about
fiscal coercion in the Spending Clause context would lessen the analytical
importance of the state fiscal issues that courts have found so troubling,
which relate to the idea of the “excessively attractive offer.”253 Evidence
of whether states lack volition in regard to particular conditioned funding
would be derived not only from the size of the grant and the fiscal con-
straints and policy imperatives that increase the irresistability of the grant
to the states, but also from the extent to which acceptance of the grant
would require states to cede fundamental aspects of their sovereignty.254
Not every condition affecting sovereignty would present strong evi-
dence of coercion. Some incursions are fairly narrow, and some are so
intertwined with the purpose of the grant that acceptance of funds for
that purpose would necessarily imply voluntary acceptance of the condi-
tion. However, situations such as these can be ferretted out in the close
scrutiny that should be triggered whenever spending conditions require
states to relinquish aspects of their sovereignty. Examination of the ex-
tent to which federal conditions intrude upon state sovereignty is well
249. See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A
Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1289–90
(2013).
250. See Fisher, supra note 243, at 363; Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 237, at 391.
251. See Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 237, at 391.
252. See Crowley, supra note 122.
253. See Dickert, supra note 246, at 37.
254. In general, states jealously guard their sovereignty and begrudge incursions by the
federal government into matters seen as primarily state concerns. At the Constitutional
Convention itself, decision-making regularly had to accommodate what one delegate called
“the jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.” See Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Yet in
numerous instances states have accepted federal grant funds conditioned on adherence to
federal mandates concerning governmental structures and processes and federal policy
choices in areas over which Congress was given no regulatory authority by the Constitu-
tion. See supra notes 121–130 and accompanying text.
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within judicial competence, and addition of this factor to the determina-
tion of coerciveness should help to allay judicial concerns about
justiciability.
An approach that considers the unpalatableness of the condition as
well as the attractiveness of the offered funding when assessing coercive-
ness would enhance the validity and utility of the voluntariness analysis in
Spending Clause cases. However, exclusive reliance on a voluntariness
analysis of any sort would continue to misdirect Spending Clause analysis
from constitutional to contractual issues and would place the responsibil-
ity for problems on the states for failing to refuse proffered funds,255
rather than on Congress for exceeding its constitutional authority. Partic-
ularly in light of the limited bargaining power of the states in the process
of “contracting” for conditioned federal grants, the voluntariness analysis
is simply an inadequate tool for assuring that such important constitu-
tional values are safeguarded.
States’ voluntary acceptance is, of course, relevant to the validity of a
spending measure, as the Spending Clause gives Congress no authority to
force either funds or conditions upon the states.256 However, the role of
this factor should be secondary. A constitutionally valid approach to
Spending Clause jurisprudence must focus initially on the scope of the
power delegated to Congress by the Constitution, rather than envisioning
an extra-constitutional power of individual states to expand congressional
power by agreement.
F. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS ON SPENDING CONDITIONS
Analysis of the validity of congressional spending conditions should be-
gin with the language of the Spending Clause itself, as did the Chief Jus-
tice’s opinion on this issue in NFIB.257 The Spending Clause does nothing
more than authorize Congress to expend federal funds to provide for the
general welfare of the United States.258 Congressional authority to im-
pose substantive requirements on recipients of federal funds arises from
its right and power to “ensure that the funds are used by the States to
‘provide for the . . . general welfare’ in the manner Congress in-
tended.”259 Applying this principle to the condition requiring state recipi-
255. The Chief Justice, in his NFIB opinion, admonished the states for accepting condi-
tions that they found objectionable:  “In the typical case we look to the States to defend
their prerogatives by adopting the simple expedient of not yielding to federal blandish-
ments when they do not want to embrace the federal policies as their own. The States are
separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act like it.” Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2633 (2012) (citation omitted); see also Davis v.
Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 655 (1999) (treating the notice requirement as a
mechanism by which States are enabled to “be vigilant in policing the boundaries of fed-
eral power”).
256. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
257. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
258. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
259. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603.
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ents of Medicaid funds to participate in the Medicaid Expansion, the
Chief Justice stated:
We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the receipt of
funds on the States’ complying with restrictions on the use of those
funds because that is the means by which Congress ensures that the
funds are spent according to its view of the “general Welfare.” Con-
ditions that do not here govern the use of the [Medicaid] funds, how-
ever, cannot be justified on that basis.260
The idea that the Spending Clause authorizes only conditions relating
to the use and management of the federal funds to which the condition is
attached was not newly minted by the Chief Justice in NFIB. It is implicit
in the early cases,261 and was at the center of Justice O’Connor’s dissent
in Dole.262 Justice O’Connor distinguished legitimate “spending condi-
tions” that relate to the use of grant funds from what she called “regula-
tory conditions” that establish requirements that are external to control
of the grant funds and hence unauthorized by the Spending Clause.263
The drinking age condition challenged in Dole clearly fit into the category
of regulatory conditions and thus, in Justice O’Connor’s view, fell outside
Congress’s spending power and was invalid unless congressional author-
ity to impose a uniform drinking age could be found elsewhere in the
Constitution.264
A conditioning authority that is limited to directing the use and man-
agement of the federal grant funds would parallel Congress’s power to
control the administration of a spending program carried out by the fed-
eral government itself. Consider, for example, a federal highway con-
struction initiative administered by the federal government rather than by
the states. The federal government would have complete authority over
the scope, design, and administrative structure for the program. It could
establish criteria for selection of projects to be funded, construction speci-
fications, fiscal controls, data gathering parameters, and requirements for
public input. However, the fact that the federal government is conducting
a highway construction program would not give rise to a federal authority
to establish a uniform national drinking age.265 There is no basis for con-
cluding that a congressional power to impose such a requirement materi-
alizes when Congress uses the states as the instruments for implementing
the highway construction program rather than administering the program
260. Id. at 2604–05.
261. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1990); Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
262. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212–18 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 215–16 (“When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is enti-
tled to insist that the highway be a safe one. But it is not entitled to insist as a condition of
the use of highway funds that the State impose or change regulations in other areas of the
State’s social and economic life because of an attenuated or tangential relationship to high-
way use or safety. Indeed, if the rule were otherwise, the Congress could effectively regu-
late almost any area of the State’s social, political, or economic life. . . .”).
265. See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
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itself.266
The Dole majority gave lip service to a limitation of this sort, stating
that “conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unre-
lated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or pro-
grams.’”267 As applied by the Dole Court, however, the requirement that
the condition be germane to the federal funding program was trans-
formed from a means of maintaining congressional control of the funds
into a power to impose conditions that are extraneous to the funded pro-
gram, but share a commonality of purpose with that program.268 The
Court found the drinking age condition to be valid because it was related
to highway safety, one of the purposes of the federal highway construc-
tion program.269 Stated the Court, “[B]y enacting § 158, Congress condi-
tioned the receipt of federal funds in a way reasonably calculated to
address [an] impediment to a purpose for which the funds are
expended.”270
This expansive and deferential view of congressional authority to legis-
late in the form of spending conditions bears a marked resemblance to
the “rational basis” test used to evaluate the constitutional validity of
most social and economic legislation.271 The rational basis test reflects the
idea that the lawmaking function is constitutionally allocated to the legis-
lature, and hence the courts should defer to legislative judgments regard-
ing the necessity for, or wisdom of, a duly enacted law.272 Under this test,
a challenged law need only have a rational relation to a valid state inter-
est in order to pass constitutional muster.273
Like the rational basis test, the Dole standard begins by identifying a
legitimate purpose underlying the legislative enactment.274 In rational ba-
sis analysis, the impotence of the test is assured by the Court’s willingness
to accept any conceivable purpose that might underlie the legislation; the
Dole analysis similarly assures the impotence of its analysis by its willing-
ness to view the congressional purpose of the funding and the challenged
condition at an extremely broad level of generality.275 Both the rational
266. A requirement authorized by some other source of congressional authority, such
as the Commerce Clause, can, of course, be imposed on the states in the form of a funding
condition. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 cl. 3.
267. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
268. See id. at 208–09.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 209. This statement seems to imply the existence of an impediment that will
prevent completion of the project on which funds were being expended—that is, highway
construction. If so limited, the concept would be consistent with a congressional power to
assure the implementation of the funded project. However, the application of the stated
principle negates this interpretation, as the drinking age posed no obstacle to construction
of highways in the manner desired by Congress.
271. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 151 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
272. U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175–79 (1980).
273. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Williamson
v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
274. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
275. See id.
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basis test and the Dole Spending Clause analysis then require only that
the challenged law bear a rational connection to achievement of that
purpose.276
Dole’s germaneness analysis thus is not an examination of whether the
condition is sufficiently connected to the funding program to be justified
within the unique parameters of the spending power. Rather, it is the
familiar means-end analysis associated with determining whether a regu-
latory enactment is a legitimate use of the legislative power.277 As such, it
is not an appropriate mechanism for determining whether Congress has
exceeded the quite different type of authority granted by the Spending
Clause.
In the cases that gave rise to the “rational basis” test, the Court was
considering the constitutionality of a legislative policy choice of a sort
that the legislature is constitutionally empowered to make, and which is
therefore entitled to judicial deference under the principle of separation
of powers.278 The analogous inquiry in the Spending Clause context is
whether a given spending program furthers the general welfare—a ques-
tion on which the Court should, and does, accord substantial deference to
Congress.279
Determining whether a particular condition is sufficiently related to the
expenditure of funds that Congress should be allowed to impose the con-
dition even though it is not otherwise empowered to do so by the Consti-
tution is a matter on which deference to Congress is neither demanded
nor justified. Unlike determinations of regulatory policy, defining the
scope of constitutional grants of power is an inherently judicial func-
tion.280 Dole’s deferential approach to the germaneness issue thus was
unwarranted and opened the door to creation of a substantive federal
power comparable to the police power, and capable of arrogating to Con-
gress the areas of governance reserved to the states.281 A reading of the
germaneness requirement that more faithfully reflects both precedent
and constitutional structure would require that a condition give effect to
the programmatic purpose of the grant, not that it merely share its gen-
eral policy objective.
The Chief Justice’s opinion in NFIB appeared to acknowledge and ap-
276. See id. at 208–09.
277. See id. at 208–09, 207 n.3.
278. In a case involving the appropriate level of deference to Congress under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, Justice Kennedy distinguished the highly deferential “rational
basis” test, citing that test’s use in “challenges to a state’s exercise of its own powers, pow-
ers not confined by the principles that control the limited nature of our National Govern-
ment.” United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 151 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
279. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 & n.2.
280. See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (citing McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405–06 (1819)).
281. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (“Our deference in matters of policy cannot . . . become
abdication in matters of law.”); see id. at 2661 (joint dissent) (citing the importance of
federal balance and its role in securing freedom as basis for refusing to abjure judicial
scrutiny of difficult Spending Clause issues).
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ply this concept of the germaneness requirement.282 The Chief Justice
reasoned that conditions relating to the Medicaid Expansion did not con-
stitute instructions on use of funds for the (separate) Medicaid program;
thus, conditioning the Medicaid grant on implementation of the Medicaid
Expansion exceeded the power granted to Congress by the Spending
Clause.283Accordingly, the Chief Justice’s opinion rejected the apparent
holding of Dole that the drinking age condition, which did not instruct on
the use of any federal grant funds, satisfied the germaneness
requirement.284
If limited to this idea, the Chief Justice’s opinion would have paved the
way for a shift in the analysis of Spending Clause cases from a question of
state volition to the more constitutionally appropriate question of con-
gressional power. Instead, the opinion used an analytical sleight of hand
to redirect what began as a power-based inquiry back to the issue of vol-
untariness.285 Dole was recast as holding that the effect of a lack of ger-
maneness is merely to shift the analysis to the question of coercion.286
Implicit in this approach is the idea that a condition that Congress is not
empowered to impose under the authority of the Spending Clause can
nonetheless be imposed under a quasi-contract theory, so long as the of-
fer of funds is not coercive and the state’s acceptance is voluntary.287
Since failure to satisfy the germaneness requirement implicitly means that
the power to impose the condition cannot be derived from the Spending
Clause, the source of Congress’s power to make such an offer and to
enter into the resulting contract is not clear. The Chief Justice’s opinion
does not address this problem.
The Chief Justice was correct in perceiving that both voluntariness and
germaneness have a role to play in determining the validity of a spending
measure.288 However, they are not alternative bases for upholding a con-
dition. The question of voluntary acceptance arises only if the condition is
one that Congress is constitutionally authorized to impose.289 The Chief
Justice’s opinion thus can be seen as only a partial step toward rational-
izing and clarifying Spending Clause analysis.
282. See id. at 2634 (majority opinion).
283. Id. at 2604–06.
284. Id. at 2604.
285. See id. at 2623 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
dissenting in part).
286. See id. at 2604 (majority opinion). After noting that the condition in Dole was not
a restriction on how the funds were to be used, the opinion states, “[w]e accordingly asked
whether ‘the financial inducement offered by Congress’ was ‘so coercive as to pass the
point at which “pressure turns into compulsion.”’” Id. at 2604. The opinion then proceeds
to apply a coerciveness analysis, and concludes that the condition requiring implementa-
tion of the Medicaid Expansion was coercive and hence invalid. Id. at 2604–05. In pursuing
this questionable line of reasoning, the Chief Justice may have been attempting to avoid
conflict with the Dole precedent. Further, the case had been argued on a coercion theory,
and thus arguments about the independent significance of a negative ruling on the ger-
maneness issue were not before the Court.
287. See id. at 2661 (joint dissent).
288. See id. at 2604–05 (majority opinion).
289. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S., 203, 207 (1987).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In NFIB the Roberts Court broke sharply with the laissez-faire Spend-
ing Clause jurisprudence that had continued even through the resurgence
of federalism in the late twentieth century.290 The Court began a much-
needed re-examination of how a broad and flexible spending power can
function within a system of government that values state sovereignty and
local control of individual and community life. Both the Chief Justice’s
opinion and the joint dissent struggled to articulate a coherent analysis
that captured their sense that the Medicaid Expansion enacted by the
ACA intruded too far upon state prerogatives. Much of the Justices’
problem stemmed from attempting to fit their analyses within the param-
eters set by the misguided Dole precedent.291 As noted, Dole treated fed-
eral spending measures as quasi-contractual in nature, such that
constitutionality was dependent on the legitimacy of the state’s accept-
ance of the contract terms rather than on the substance of those terms.292
Under Dole, a state’s voluntary acceptance of conditioned federal funds
vitiated any concerns about federalism and state sovereignty.293  Thus the
full responsibility for the erosion of federalism values was placed on the
states for accepting the inappropriately conditioned funds rather than on
Congress for exceeding its constitutional authority.
If the Court is, as it has repeatedly stated, concerned that an unlimited
spending power creates the potential for Congress to become “a parlia-
ment of the whole,”294 it must adopt a form of analysis capable of avert-
ing that result. The power of the national government is without practical
limits unless more demanding constraints are placed on Congress’s ability
to enact substantive mandates as conditions on the receipt of federal
funds.295 Nor can the sovereignty of states and the liberty interests associ-
ated therewith be preserved if state governments—and the policy issues
for which they have traditionally been responsible—are subject to con-
gressional control through funding conditions.
290. That resurgence was marked by new limits on the scope of congressional powers
under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, new force to
the Tenth Amendment as a limit on congressional power to compel state legislative or
regulatory activity, expansion of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and new limits on the availability of habeas corpus to question state criminal convic-
tions. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 113, at 1. Commentators expected that the Court
would inject greater balance into its Spending Clause jurisprudence as well. See, e.g., Lynn
A. Baker, The Revival of States’ Rights: A Progress Report and a Proposal, 22 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 95, 102 (1998); Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The
Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461,
488–89 (2002). However, the dominant Spending Clause case of this period, South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), offered only lip service to federalism values.
291. Of the present Justices, only Scalia was on the Court when Dole was decided. In
Dole Scalia joined the majority. See Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). In NFIB he was one of the
authors of the joint dissent. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
292. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12.
293. See id.
294. See authorities cited supra note 63.
295. Dole, 483 U.S. at 215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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The current weak voluntariness inquiry clearly is insufficient to protect
these important values, particularly in light of the fiscal pressures faced
by states. Broadening the coercion inquiry to include additional indica-
tors of diminished state volition would give more legitimacy to judicial
analysis of the contractual concepts of voluntariness and coercion. How-
ever, framing an analysis that captures the federalism values embedded in
the constitution requires that Spending Clause doctrine be freed from the
overly constricting Dole analysis.296
Although the NFIB opinions signal a new, more careful approach to
Spending Clause analysis, they disappoint in failing to extricate the law in
this area from the contractual parameters that dominated late twentieth
century Spending Clause jurisprudence. Though they give lip service to
the important constitutional values implicit in the concepts of federalism
and state sovereignty,297 the NFIB opinions fail fully to explore the impli-
cations of these structural concerns. Perhaps the Court did not feel it was
necessary to do so in order to decide the questions presented by the
NFIB case. However, the need for this exploration remains, and it is
hoped that the Court will take advantage of future opportunities to finish
what was begun in NFIB.
296. Indeed, the Chief Justice’s opinion may have been attempting to do just that. It
does not use Dole as its starting point, relying instead on earlier cases in which the contract
analogy is but one of several analytical touchstones. See NFIB, 1321 S. Ct. at 2601–02.
297. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03; id. at 2658–61 (joint dissent).
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